PACS numbers:
Fontenele and collaborators [1] reported extensive analyses of power-law scalings of neuronal avalanches from experimental recordings and from numerical simulations of a model. One of their main conclusions is that the brain may operate at criticality in specific regimes. We show here that two non-critical systems exhibit similar behaviors as those used to conclude on criticality, and thus, the experimental observations provided in [1] are not sufficient to support the conclusion that the system is at criticality.
Various non-critical phenomena can display power-law scalings similar to critical systems [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , and it is thus important to confront experimental evidences to control, non-critical systems, to assess if a system is critical. No such control was provided in [1] . We study here two control models proposed in [6] and apply the methods of [1] consisting in checking whether power-law exponents of the distribution of durations and sizes of neuronal avalanches satisfy the crackling relationship [7] . This relationship, universal in a class of systems, stipulates that if the tails of the distribution of avalanche sizes and durations are power-law (with slope τ and τ t respectively) and if the average avalanche size of duration t scales as t a , crackling systems at criticality should be such that τt−1 τ −1 = a. We showed previously that this relationship was not valid in the two specific non-critical models of [6] under appropriate assumptions, and the authors refer to this result to use the crackling relationship as a sufficient condition for criticality.
However, the authors fitted power-laws to the bulk of the distribution rather than the tail (since they used truncated datasets, with distinct cutoffs for each dataset). When using this methodology on the spike trains of the non-critical systems in [6] , one finds that truncations have a dramatic impact on power-law exponents, particularly on the ratio (τ t − 1)/(τ − 1) (see Fig. 1 ), while a barely changes. As a consequence, appropriate choices of thresholds yield data perfectly compatible with the crackling relationship as in [1] (or even with the universal scaling reported in Fig.2g of [1] ). The fact that these control models display similar behaviors as the experimental data between cortical states in [1] implies that these statistics alone do not constitute a proof that the system operates at criticality and alternative theories could be provided.
Undoubtedly, the article in [1] highlighting very similar neuronal behaviors in vastly distinct species and 'cognitive' states (ex-vivo, slides, anesthetized and behaving) opens fascinating perspectives for investigation on its ori- . Top: scaling relationships: parameters a (blue stars) and ratio (τt − 1)/(τ − 1) (black squares) overlap for a specific choice of threshold cutoff. Bottom: The estimated ratio (τt − 1)/(τ − 1) on truncated distributions shows substantial variations as a function of cutoff (blue bar: averaged ratio, with std), for thresholds for the size and duration thresholds linearly ranging from 10 to 100. Power-laws for size and duration estimated with maximum likelihood [9] and average size of avalanches of a given duration were fitted using a linear regression in log-log scale.
gin and relevance, and theoretical models, both critical and non-critical, shall be instrumental to progress in this endeavor. However, to date, the present evidence highlights the fact that the question whether the brain operates at a critical point between cortical states still remains open.
